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Refining the Matsushita Standard and the Role
Economics Can Play
James Langenfeld and James Morsch*
The conference that generated the papers in this journal brought
together a diverse group of academics, lawyers, and economists to
celebrate and reflect on the twentieth anniversary of the Supreme
Court's storied decision in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp.1 From our perspective as the conference's moderators, two
themes emerged: (1) the continued uncertainty surrounding the proper
standard for evaluating evidence in a horizontal conspiracy case where
the evidence of collusion is circumstantial and the market at issue
oligopolistic, and (2) the crucial but limited role economists can and
should play in such cases. In this short article, we briefly analyze each
of these issues. We conclude that evidence of back-and-forth
communications between alleged conspirators should be at least one
"plus factor" used in evaluating an alleged conspiracy, and that
economic analysis can provide important evidence on whether the
alleged conspiracy is likely to have existed.
REFINING THE MATSUSHITA STANDARD
In the twenty years since the Court's decision in Matsushita, many
courts have attempted to articulate the type of evidence needed at the
summary judgment stage in an antitrust conspiracy case where no direct
evidence of a collusive agreement exists. These so-called "plus factors"
have generated considerable controversy but, more importantly, they are
generally viewed as in need of further refinement. Professor Bill Page's
substantial and thoughtful article recommends such a refinement,
suggesting that courts require proof of communication between alleged
conspirators in a case where there is no explicit evidence of an
agreement. In general, the conference received his suggestion as an
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interesting and innovative way to help separate illegal collusion from
legal unilateral parallel actions in a concentrated industry (the
"oligopoly problem"). It is, after all, difficult to imagine a successful
coordination of rivals without some type of communication back and
forth between the participants or, failing that, some history of collusion
in the industry at issue. Even economists who have argued that proper
economic analysis can provide useful evidence on the existence of an
agreement have conceded the need for communications to be a part of
the analysis.
2
Practitioners' reactions to Professor Page's proposal to add
competitor communications as an additional plus factor on summary
judgment, not surprisingly, are likely to depend on the clients they
normally represent in these types of cases. Mark McLaughlin, a defense
lawyer, embraces the notion as a way of helping trial courts weed out
cases that may be thick with mountains of evidence-but the quality of
that evidence on the question of conspiracy is weak.3 Michael Freed, a
preeminent plaintiffs' antitrust lawyer, believes that adding a
communication requirement would unfairly raise the bar and make it
more difficult for many plaintiffs to survive summary judgment.4 What
both of these commentators implicitly acknowledge is that clearer
standards on summary judgment in Sherman section 1 cases are indeed
needed, but that care should be taken to insure that good cases get to the
jury and inherently implausible ones should be weeded out on summary
judgment.
The trouble with establishing a clear standard, as we all know from
practical experience, is that much of the world operates based on
nonverbal communication and "an agreement" can be reached in a
variety of ways. How do we make sense of the somewhat ambiguous
legal definition? Perhaps the best way to view communications
between competitors is as a threshold issue for the ability to conspire.
Communications among competitors, even absent explicit evidence of
an agreement not to compete, can enhance the ability of competitors to
reach an agreement and to monitor whether firms are complying with
any agreement. That is, communications offer rivals opportunities to
2. See Gregory Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling
Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 719, 780 (2004) ("The existence of an
agreement should not be inferred absent some evidence of communications of some kind among
the defendants.").
3. T. Mark McLaughlin, Comments on Professor Page's Discussion of Matsushita, 38 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 467 (2007).
4. Michael J. Freed, Comments on Professor Page's Discussion of Matsushita: Plaintiffs'
Perspective, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 461 (2007).
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develop collusive strategies and reduce the risk of competitors cheating
on any agreement, and so can facilitate keeping prices above the level
that would occur even in an oligopolistic market (where independently
acting competitors take into account the actions by other firms).
Accordingly, absent at least some evidence of such communications,
plaintiffs probably should be required to offer a legitimate explanation
about how the alleged conspiracy operated based on other relevant facts
in order to survive summary judgment. Such an analysis could be
offered through an economist, industry officials, or relevant documents,
and might include evidence of past collusion or perhaps evidence of
indirect communications through third parties who share the alleged
competitors' goal of maximizing industry profits.5
THE ROLE ECONOMICS CAN PLAY
The conference also focused on whether economic analysis has much
to contribute for "plus factors" in evaluating a conspiracy lacking direct
evidence of an agreement. Economics has established certain condi-
tions that are in general necessary for a conspiracy to operate
successfully. Typically, a conspiracy not to compete involves parallel
action, such as price increases occurring at similar times or firms not
expanding sales into other firms' territories or customers. However,
these conditions can also occur where there is competition, so by
themselves they would not be considered sufficient to show a
conspiracy. Also, in general, conspiracies are more likely to be possible
with fewer competitors, such as in an oligopoly. 6 In an oligopoly,
however, economics teaches us that firms are likely to anticipate the
actions of their competitors in determining their strategies, such as
pricing and where to try to sell their products, even absent an agreement
to fix prices or not to compete.7
For example, assume that firms A and B each dominate different
regions of the United States. They may conspire not to expand into
each other's territories, and thus can charge supracompetitive prices in
each territory. Alternatively, firm A may unilaterally decide not to
5. For example, there might be extensive communications through investment firms that
follow an industry, who could also gain from higher profits driven by a conspiracy. Judge
Richard Posner has suggested a variety of other factors that might be included as relevant for
inferring an agreement. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE ch. 4 (1976); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW ch. 3 (2d ed. 2001).
6. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
7. For a discussion that highlights the difficulties economics encounter in evaluating
conspiracies in an oligopoly setting, see MICHAEL D. WI-NSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST
ECONOMICS 20 (2006).
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expand into the territory dominated by firm B without any agreement.
Why? Firm A may anticipate that firm B would retaliate by expanding
into firm A's territory-and visa versa. As this example illustrates, in
oligopoly markets where collusion is most likely, it can be particularly
difficult to separate collusion from nonconspiratorial actions.
Lawyers and courts often turn to economists hoping they can provide
some clarity on the question of whether courts should infer a
conspiratorial agreement from conduct alone where competitors are
expected to take their rivals' action into consideration. Given the
Court's decision in Matsushita, it is clear that economics can be helpful
in answering whether it would be economically rational for the market
players to conspire, and the Court dismissed the case on summary
judgment when it found the answer to be no. 8 The question is whether
economic analysis can be used not only as a "minus factor" as in
Matsushita, but also as a "plus factor" in determining whether a
conspiracy actually existed.
There seems to be a broad consensus supporting Dan Shulman's 9 and
the Sedona Working Group's 1° conclusion that economic testimony can
be helpful in answering some basic questions that go to "plus factors"
beyond parallel behavior. One area of plus factors is showing that
certain thresholds for the economic plausibility of a conspiracy exist.
For example, is the market sufficiently concentrated that it could
plausibly meet the necessary conditions for a successful conspiracy and
thus make "economic sense"? The second area focuses on whether
there is evidence of firm behavior that would be profitable with a
conspiracy, but not profitable without conspiracy. 1 This area goes
beyond the "necessary" into what might be considered "sufficient"
evidence (or at least an independent plus factor) for surviving summary
judgment. The typical example here would be showing that a price
increase by a firm would not be profitable unless the other firms
followed, the other firms had a strong profit incentive and ability to
keep prices lower, but all of the other firms nevertheless immediately
followed the price increase. Another example might be where firms in a
market had strong profit incentives to expand sales into other territories,
8. 475 U.S. at 587.
9. Daniel R. Shulman, Matsushita and the Role of Economists with Regard to Proof of
Conspiracy, 38 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 497 (2007).
10. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, WORKING GROUP ON THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS IN
ANTITRUST, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY ON THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS IN
ANTITRUST LAW (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org.
11. See Werden, supra note 2, at 767.
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even considering the potential for any likely unilateral retaliation, but
did not expand.
Economic analysis, however, can only do so much. As Dr. Salinger's
paper highlights, "When economists testify on subjects where the
economics is inherently inconclusive, there is a real risk that it will get
out of hand."'12  As discussed above, economics teaches that it is
difficult to infer a conspiracy only from market information of parallel
conduct in an oligopoly setting, 13 and it is probably improper for an
economist to testify as to the existence of a conspiratorial agreement.
David Marx takes this argument further. 14 To paraphrase his article, (1)
economists sometimes go too far and testify to conclusions that are
within the province of the jury, (2) dueling economists tend to cancel
each other out at trial, and (3) forcing the jury to listen to dueling
economists may actually take the focus away from the central legal
issue at trial, i.e., did the defendants really agree to fix prices, allocate
customers, or reduce output. However, even considering the example
provided by David Marx, it does not appear that his criticism relates to
economic analysis and reasoning, but to the use of expert economists
when there are other ways to present that evidence to the jury.
There is little disagreement that economists should not testify in areas
beyond their expertise, and economists and economic analyses by
themselves cannot prove the defendants charged with wrongdoing
explicitly agreed to collude. However, economists (or at least economic
analyses) can provide evidence on the plausibility of conspiracy, and
whether the actions of the firms in the market are consistent or
inconsistent with an alleged conspiracy.
CONCLUSION
As in any conspiracy case, proof of illicit conduct is an inherently
fact-driven inquiry. Cases with theories of conspiracy that do not make
economic sense, lack any evidence of past collusion, or do not show
some communications probably should be disposed of on summary
judgment. The remainder should go to the jury as long as sufficient
"plus factors" can be shown, and economic analysis can provide some
of those "plus factors."
12. Michael A. Salinger, The Legacy of Matsushita: The Role of Economics in Antitrust
Litigation, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 475 (2007).
13. WHINSTON, supra note 7, at 20.
14. David Marx, Jr., The "Proper"-And By That I Mean Limited-Role for Economists in
Price-Fixing Litigation, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 491 (2007).
2007]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Against this background, we believe that the prospect that the
Supreme Court may impose Matsushita's standards on plaintiffs at the
pleading stage should be troubling for lawyers and economists alike.
15
Plaintiffs are unlikely to possess substantial economic or other evidence
useful for evaluating the plausibility of a conspiracy prior to discovery,
except perhaps where there is evidence of past collusion. Shifting the
burden typically imposed at summary judgment to the pleading phase,
therefore, would likely discourage potentially meritorious cases or
reward plaintiffs' lawyers who are willing to plead "plus factors"
without a substantial basis in fact. If courts were to add
communications among the defendants as another "plus factor" (as we
and Professor Page recommend) and require that it be shown at the
pleadings stage, then plaintiffs' burden would be substantially greater
because such communications rarely are available to plaintiffs absent
discovery into the defendants' records.
15. As we are writing this article, the U.S. Supreme Court is in the process of deciding
whether plaintiffs should be required at the pleading stage to set forth their plus factor evidence.
See Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2965
(No. 05-1126).
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